Abstract. Information H is a unique relationship between probabilities, based on the property of independence which is central to scientific methodology. Information Geometry makes the tempting but fallacious assumption that a local metric (conventionally based on information) can be used to endow the space of probability distributions with a preferred global Riemannian metric.
INFORMATION
The Bayesian sum and product rules allow us to do rational inference in accordance with a unique calculus [1, 2] which places probability on the unit simplex (∑ i p i = 1). The calculus is profitably extended by quantifying, as some function H(p; q), the magnitude of change when a source distribution q = (q 1 , q 2 , . . .) is updated to a destination distribution p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . .). Other destinations might also satisfy the constraints, but would be "worse" in the sense of involving more distortion.
To uncover the form of H (if one exists), we use independence. A logician might quibble that there can never be true independence because everything's connected to everything else. However, most connections are negligible, hence ignorable, otherwise we couldn't proceed at all. Problem A (winning my village lottery) doesn't noticeably influence problem B (getting a "six" next time I toss a die). Those two processes are deemed independent, and no practical consequence is expected if we choose to analyse them together. The unique "p log(p/q)" information formula (generally attributed to Shannon [3] by physicists and to Kullback and Leibler [4] by statisticians) follows:
We see that H ≥ 0 with equality if and only if p = q, so it quantifies the distortion of p away from an arbitrary source distribution q. This formula holds for arbitrary probabilities, and it satisfies independence. Hence the sought function H can exist, and it takes this uniquely defined form.
Minimising any other function leads to interference between independent applications, and that's unacceptable in a calculus of inference. Generalising the truth is a mistake which necessarily admits counter-examples.
Alternative proposals
Unfortunately, the definition of information remains questioned. Perhaps the term "entropy" (related to the negative of information) has caused confusion.
In physics, entropy quantifies the uncertainty about a system's state that remains after macroscopic constraints (on volume, temperature and so on) are applied. The combinatorics of a macroscopic system with independent components quickly lead to a "− ∑ p log p" entropy, and it's tempting to view this as a justification of that formula. Actually, it's no more than a sanity check, because any system with independence necessarily conforms. Conversely, systems lacking independence must and do have different formulas for their entropy. But that does not justify using different formulas for the information H from which those formulas ultimately derive.
The most popular alternative formula, invented without derivation, is
as propounded by Rényi [5] and by Tsallis [6] . There are various special cases:
(All these formulas have easy generalisations to non-normalised distributions.) We proceed to test the outcomes of minimising Rényi-Tsallis in various situations.
First counter-example
Consider the direct product of two probability distributions, p (1) = ( ). My chance of winning the village lottery is 1 in 10, and my chance of a "six" when I next throw a die is 1 in 6. Minimising the information (1) relative to uniform source q correctly produces the direct-product result p (1) × p (2) = ( ). Rényi-Tsallis does not. With α = 2, which is least-squares, that result would involve a negative value if least-squares were taken seriously. In practice, positivity would supervene and force a hard zero. What's expected What's delivered
The zero value indicates that winning the village lottery would prevent me throwing "six" with my next die -an implication that defies common sense.
Second counter-example
Consider the distribution of unit mass
across the a-priori-uniform unit square (0, 1)×(0, 1). Known moments
constrain the centre of mass to (x, y) = (
). This is in no way a difficult dataset. Take α → 0. Minimising H † 0 under these constraints yieldŝ
with over half the mass concentrated into a delta-function singularity at the exact corner. This solution, inaccessible to any setting of Lagrange multipliers, would be rejected by any thoughtful user, who would object to the coarse constraint producing an infinitely sharp result.
Systematic misbehaviour
Misbehaviour occurs whenever α = 1. Minimising H † α under integral constraints
where F = ∑ λ k f k is linear in the f 's, with Lagrange multipliers λ as coefficients. For constraints so weak as to be ineffective, F ≈ 1. For less weak constraints, F stays positive everywhere so thatp is bounded. But, as the constraints require greater non-uniformity, the minimum value of F may shrink to zero. When α > 1, the consequence is that the densityp becomes zero. As the constraints are strengthened even more, the Lagrange-multiplier solution (7) cannot respond without sendingp negative. That being prohibited, a hard zero is imposed at the minimum of F. Each such zero, as it comes into play, removes the influence of H † α until none remains. There is still a 1:1 correspondence between constraint values and the optimalp, but duality with Lagrange multipliers λ fails because multipliers no longer characterise the result. constraints
When α < 1, the consequence is that the densityp becomes infinite. In a space of suitably high dimension, this can happen without the constraint values f k becoming singular, as volumetric factors stabilise the infinite density by giving it finite mass. As the constraints are strengthened even more, the Lagrange-multiplier solution (7) cannot respond without sendingp negative. Again, duality fails. Instead, a delta-function singularity is imposed at the minimum of F, which absorbs any further added mass.
Conclusion regarding the information formula
Scientific methodology requires results to be tested, and if (as here) a proposal fails simple tests, it cannot be recommended for complicated work. Danger lies not in simple problems where an immediate absurdity will guard the user against accepting error, but in more complicated situations where the consequences may be disguised and insidious.
Generalising the truth by ignoring relevant criteria (here, independence) damages it, and necessarily yields unacceptable results. This presages similar difficulties that arise when information is misinterpreted as geometry.
For inference, the only acceptable value for the Rényi-Tsallis parameter is α = 1, which is the correct information (1). That negates the generalisation to α = 1 which underlies Amari's "α-divergences" [7] in information geometry.
GEOMETRY
Being a smooth function, H necessarily has a symmetric second derivative
which is widely used as a Riemannian metric g i j in an identification usually attributed to Fisher [8] and Rao [9] . There, the length element d is defined by
Geodesic curves and lengths, and densities, are then constructed in the standard way, with microscopic local triangulation promoted to the macroscopic level.
Paths, lengths, density
The geodesic path from q to p, linearly parameterised by θ and confined to the unit simplex, is
where
is basically Rényi-Tsallis with α = 1 2 , and is somewhat greater than the Hellinger distance 4 sin(γ/2) which would be accessible if paths could leave the simplex. Meanwhile, the density over the unit simplex is
Fundamental inconsistency
The connective H is "from-to" directed and not symmetric: H(p; q) = H(q; p). Its uniqueness implies that no acceptable symmetric connective exists. Geometric distance can be artificially endowed on the space, but any such distance is symmetric by construction, (p; q) = (q; p). So, any definition of geometric distance is necessarily incompatible with the independence that is at the heart of probabilistic practice.
Probabilities do not form a metric space.
More precisely, imposition of a distance is incompatible with independence, and it's simply not possible to do science if irrelevant independent unknowns can't be discarded without changing the results.
Awkward consequences must follow, and they do, as will be seen.
Geodesic paths
Consider a simple 2-cell probability problem, in which a path starts at q = ( ) and ends at p = (1, 0). Normalisation only allows one degree of freedom, so there's only one track, (a, b) with a + b = 1, which the geodesic must follow.
Now take the direct product of this problem with a second problem, which happens to be the same, so the product path starts at ( Geometry does not distinguish between the three "β " cells. This elementary example demonstrates that geodesic paths do not conform to the independence that the informed user of probability might expect. Start and finish points q and p do not in themselves define a unique path between them. In fact, the basic Bayesian task of learning about the contents of a domain does not even require a dimension, let alone a geometry. Thus the answers are the same whether a unit square is decomposed in two dimensions, or as a one-dimensional spiral, or some quite different pattern. The choice is arbitrary, and usually made for computational convenience rather than reference to a supposedly pre-eminent geometry.
•
Conclusion regarding geodesic paths
Geometry is not fundamental to Bayesian analysis or computation, and in fact the freedom to discard topology and geometry is used to advantage in the general-purpose nested-sampling algorithm [10] .
Geodesic length
Whether or not the path is confined to the simplex, the distance between two probability distributions is determined by ∑ i √ p i q i , which is basically the Rényi-Tsallis formula (2) with α = 1 2 . Accordingly, misbehaviour is expected. Take the geometrically-defined closest probability distributionp to uniform q, subject to expectation
over the 6-dimensional unit cube (− 1 2 , 1 2 ) 6 . The constraint value is E = 1, implying a degree of central condensation towards the minimum E min = 0. This could represent a particle in a 6-dimensional periodic unit cell, or perhaps two particles in a 3-dimensional box, or 6 particles in a 1-dimensional box.
Minimising the information (1) would yield the smooth exponential formp(x) ∝ exp(−3.650 E(x)) familiar to physicists as the maximum-entropy distribution. Geometrically, though, the closest-to-uniform distribution iŝ
with over half of the probability mass confined to a delta-function spike at the exact centre. 
Conclusion regarding geodesic lengths
Informed users would not accept this infinite-resolution implication being drawn from a coarse constraint. Was one of the particles in a 3-dimensional box really definitively located at the exact centre? Did the average-energy constraint really support an infinite compression, quantified by H(p; q) = ∞ bits of information?
Geometric density
Next, we test the suggestion that the √ det g geometrical density could be a plausible assignment of belief (prior probability Pr(p)), in a development taken forward by Amari [7] and followers.
First counter-example: Three proportions
The geometric prior for proportions p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) that add to 1 is
Accurate observation yields a likelihood
(If this delta function gives concern, use 1(|p 1 − p 3 | < ε) before taking ε → 0.) Perhaps masses 1 and 3 happened to balance. Perhaps the average number of spots n s = p 1 + 2p 2 + 3p 3 converged on 2 after many throws of a 3-die. There could be many applications: here we are concerned with the joint distribution Pr(data, p) = 1 2π
and what follows. On marginalising away p 1 and p 3 (each equal to 1 2 (1 − p 2 )), we reach the posterior
which has a non-integrable singularity at p 2 = 1. With probability 1, p 2 is inferred to be arbitrarily close to 1. On observing p 1 to be equal to p 3 , we are thus invited to infer that both are arbitrarily close to zero. That, surely, over-interprets the observation. The Bayesian analysis is correct, so the informed user will reject the geometric prior (16). Accurate observation reveals that the die is a rectangular parallelepiped, with faces 1 and 6, 2 and 5, and 3 and 4, being equivalent. The likelihood is
On marginalising away p 4 , p 5 , p 6 away from the joint distribition, we reach
There are now three non-integrable singularities. With probability 1, only one component survives, either p 1 = p 6 or p 2 = p 5 or p 3 = p 4 . The others are almost certainly almost zero. In lay terms, "all bricks are needles". Informed users would doubt that.
What's expected or or
What's delivered
Third counter-example: N items
The geometric prior for N items is
Measuring any accurate linear relationship |ap i − bp j | < ε ensures that p i and p j will be inferred to be almost certainly arbitrarily close to zero as the uncertainty ε becomes small.
This over-implication needs no further comment.
Third counter-example: Continuum analysis
Suppose a continuum distribution is digitised into N microcells, with N large in order to approximate the continuum well. However, data are never infinitely sharp, so that it always suffices to combine the microcells, r at a time, into larger mesocells. p N microcells r microcells P M=N/r mesocells Marginalising (23) over r microcell p's summing to a mesocell's quantity P shows the mesocell prior to be
so that the overall prior becomes
The exponents, which were −1 + Now, what ought to happen as the continuum limit r → ∞ is approached, is that the microscale exponent approaches −1 while mesoscale and macroscale exponents remain fixed. With power laws as here, this is the Dirichlet process [11] , a "process" being a family of probability distributions defined consistently at all scales.
What is actually happening here is different. The microscale exponent is staying fixed at − 1 2 while mesoscale and macroscale exponents increase indefinitely. This means that the prior for p, at observable scales, becomes indefinitely sharply peaked about exact uniformity (P 1 = P 2 = . . . = P M = 1/M). This contradicts the aim of allowing p to be usefully uncertain.
It is possible for P to be moved away from uniformity, but only by data that completely prohibit that possibility. In that event, P remains sharply defined, though relocated to the permitted maximum of P 1 P 2 . . . P M , equivalently of ∑ log P j . But that's the Rényi-Tsallis prescription with α → 0, already seen to be unacceptable.
Conclusion regarding geometric densities
If the geometric p −1/2 density is assigned at all, it has to be on a fixed grid, in which the cells can't be combined or subdivided. That grid can't be indefinitely fine, so that continuum problems are excluded. Even on a locked grid, unacceptable results follow accurate observation of any linear relationship.
Geometric manifolds
It seems unlikely that the difficulties remarked above would disappear when attention is restricted to a manifold within the probability simplex. If the density √ det g fails in general, it's unlikely to succeed in arbitrary sub-spaces. Nevertheless, we investigate the possibility.
Parameters u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . .), fewer in number than the dimension of the probability distribution, parameterise a manifold p(u) in a way that for convenience automatically imposes normalisation. The length element from (9) , as confined to the manifold, becomes
is the metric tensor in the manifold. Consequently, the geometric density is
Can this be used to assign prior probability over the manifold? The simple answer is "generally no": it's dominated by the wrong properties. If the manifold allows large gradients ∂ p/∂ u to appear anywhere, then the density will be large and prior probability will coalesce there. Yet it's the magnitude of p that matters in probabilistic analysis, not the gradient. Local gradients tend to be unobservable because data have finite resolution, so they should surely not dominate the analysis. The supposition is fundamentally misdirected.
Counter-example: Growth and decay
A user seeks two locations around the unit circle. These are the minimum and maximum of a periodic distribution. The allowed distributions are functions p(x) over the periodic unit interval x ∈ [0, 1), parameterised by the location u 1 of the minimum value, and the subsequent location u 2 of the maximum. From u 1 to u 2 , the function p grows as
with a given monotonically increasing profile f . The same profile is used in reverse as
to give decay from u 2 to the next minimum at 1 + u 1 . The profile f (a) is normalised 1 0 f (θ )dθ = 1 to ensure normalisation of p; (b) is strictly positive f > 0 to avoid division by zero; (c) is differentiable with f > 0 between its end points 0 and 1; (d) has zero slope f = 0 at those end points to avoid concern about matching. Direct evaluation gives
where A, B,C are positive constants. For example, f (t) = (8 + 6t 2 − 4t 3 )/9 gives A = 0.01762, B = 0.01273, C = 0.01636. This gives density
which is not normalisable, so cannot be used as a prior probability. The proposal fails. If the attempt is nevertheless made, then with probability one either growth is instantaneous (u 1 = u 2 ) or decay is instantaneous (u 2 = 1 + u 1 ). That's not what the user will have wanted. An ecologist interested in annual cycles would view askance the suggestion that either spring or autumn were instantaneous transitions between highest summer and deepest winter.
Geometry in thermodynamics
Physicists model systems by listing the allowed states, endowed with an appropriate counting measure (usually uniform, 1 per state). Each state i has associated observable "coordinates" X (1) i , X (2) i , . . . such as energy, volume,. . . . The system is to occupy its state subject to constraints on those values. Those values could in principle be known exactly, but it's more illuminating -and realistic -to constrain only average values so that the occupancy is somewhat uncertain, being defined by a probability distribution p restricted by
Rational assignment of p is then uniquely defined by minimising H(p; uniform) subject to the constraints, which produces the Gibbs distribution
in which the "partition function"
ensures the normalisation ∑ i p i = 1 that must always hold. If we call the X's coordinates, we can equally call the Lagrange multipliers λ "forces". They control physical observables, so are themselves observable and carry physical interpretations such as coolness (inverse temperature) to control energy, pressure to control volume, and so on. The partition function encapsulates a neat summary of all this, as its derivatives
are identifiable with the required constraint values. Going further, the second derivatives
identify the uncertainty covariance of the X's around their mean values. This uncertainty will manifest as observable fluctuations if their timescale isn't too long. The Gibbs distribution (35) can be viewed either as a function of the constraints X or as a function of the λ 's. Taking the latter view, the distributions form a manifold parameterised by λ , on which the metric (28) would evaluate to
This happens to be the same as (38) so that the geometric length element would be simply
The identification [12] is neat, but does it correspond to useful physics?
Example: Independent particles
In this simple example, the sole constraining coordinate X is energy E, which has just two levels, E = 0 and E = 1. Each level can be occupied independently by any of n equivalent classical particles. Accordingly there are in all 2 n states, which can be grouped into energy levels r = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, with n C r states having energy r. 
Its first derivative gives
so that (plausibly) energy ranges from the ground state E = 0 at infinite coolness (zero temperature) up to E = n/2 with all states equally occupied at zero coolness (infinite temperature). The physics is behaving properly.
What about geometry?
The geometric length element from (40) is
which integrates to (λ ) = n 1/2 arctan sinh(λ /2)
Unit length corresponds to unit fluctuation, and the full path between λ = 0 and λ = ∞ has length O( √ n):
With only one degree of freedom λ , the geometric prior density obeys ρ ∝ d /dλ , so is
Low temperature (high λ ) is exponentially improbable, which might disconcert the lowtemperature physicist with a rather different prior expectation.
Is it the job of theory to dictate the domain of experimentation?
